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We present a quantum dialogue protocol by using the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) state. In this paper, we point out that the ‘quantum dialogue’ communication
scheme recently introduced by Nguyen can be eavesdropped on under an intercept-
and-resend attack. We also give a revised control mode to detect this attack. Hence,
within the present version two users can exchange their secret messages securely and
simultaneously, and the efficiency of information transmission can be successfully
increased.
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Since the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard published in 1984 [1], different quan-
tum key distribution protocols have been presented [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Different from the key
distribution protocol, some quantum direct secure communication (QDSC) protocols have
been shown recently [7, 8, 9, 10], which permit important messages to be communicated
directly without first establishing a random key to encrypt them. However, these protocols
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] only permit messages to be transmitted from the sender (Alice)
to the receiver (Bob). Two parties cannot simultaneously transmit their different secret
messages to each other in only one quantum channel.
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2Very recently, Nguyen [11] proposed an entanglement-based protocol, the so-called quan-
tum dialogue, which would allow two people to exchange their messages simultaneously based
on the well-known Bostroem-Felbinger [7] protocol. Man et al. [12] proposed a modified
protocol about the quantum dialogue. It is worth mentioning that the Bostroem-Felbinger
protocol can be eavesdropped in some specific cases [13, 14]. In this paper, we show that the
quantum dialogue scheme [11] is insecure under some eavesdropping attacks, and we present
a new protocol to realize a quantum dialogue by using the GHZ state more securely. Thus,
the two users can exchange their messages securely and simultaneously. The efficiency of
information transmission is also successfully increased.
Now, let us review Nguyen’s quantum dialogue scheme. Suppose there are two users (say,
Alice and Bob) and they want to transmit their messages to each other simultaneously. Bob
first produces a large enough number of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs, all in the
state
|Ψ0,0〉ht = 1√
2
(| ↑〉h| ↓〉t + | ↓〉h| ↑〉t), (1)
where h stands for “ home, ” t stands for “ travel, ” and | ↓〉 and | ↑〉 characterize two degrees
of freedom of a qubit. Bob encodes his bits (kn, ln) (kn, ln ∈ {0, 1}) by applying an operation
Ckn,ln on the state |Ψ0,0〉ht, where C0,0, C0,1, C1,0, and C1,1 denote the Pauli matrices I, σx,
σy, and σz, respectively. He keeps one qubit (home qubit) with him and sends another
(travel qubit) to Alice. Then, Bob lets Alice know that he has sent a qubit. Alice tells Bob
that she has received a qubit. Alice encodes her bits (in, jn) (in, jn ∈ {0, 1}) by performing
an operation Cin,jn on the travel qubit; then, she sends it back to Bob. When Bob receives
the encoded travel qubit, he performs a Bell basis measurement on the qubit pair and waits
for Alice to tell him that it was a run in a message mode (MM) or in a control mode (CM).
In a MM run, Bob decodes Alice’s bits and announces his Bell basis measurement result
(xn, yn) to let Alice decode his bits. In a CM run, Alice reveals her encoding value to Bob
to check the security of their dialogue.
However, this security checking cannot detect Eve’s (eavesdropper’s) intercept-and-resend
attack. Let us suppose Eve gets the qubit t and keeps it with her. Afterwards, she creates
her own entangled pair in the same state as in Eq. (1), i.e., Eve’s pair state is
|Ψ0,0〉HT = 1√
2
(| ↑〉H | ↓〉T + | ↓〉H | ↑〉T ), (2)
and sends her qubit T to Alice. Alice, taking T for t, encodes her bits by performing
3an appropriate transformation as described above and sends it back to Bob. Then, Eve
intercepts the qubit T again and carries out a Bell basis measurement on the HT- pair to
learn Alice’s secret bits. By the same Bell basis measurement, Eve knows the encoding
transformation Alice performed on the qubit T. Eve then applies the same transformation
on the qubit t she has kept and sends it back to Bob. After Bob announces publicly his
Bell basis measurement result, Eve can deduce Bob’s bits. Clearly, Eve can eavesdrop
completely on the contents of Bob and Alice’s dialogue. Even worse, Eve’s tampering is
absolutely unnoticeable.
Now, we propose our new protocol to realize quantum dialogue by using the GHZ state
in terms of the original scheme. However in our protocol the intercept-and-resend attack,
as well as the other kinds of attacks presented by Nguyen [11], can be detected. First, we
write the eight GHZ state bases in two different bases as follows:
|ψ0,0;0,0〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)htp
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉p + |−〉t|−〉p) + |−〉h(|+〉t|−〉p + |−〉t|+〉p)], (3)
|ψ1,1;0,0〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)htp
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|−〉t|+〉p + |+〉t|−〉p) + |−〉h(|+〉t|+〉p + |−〉t|−〉p)], (4)
|ψ0,1;0,0〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉+ |011〉)htp
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉p + |−〉t|−〉p)− |−〉h(|+〉t|−〉p + |−〉t|+〉p)], (5)
|ψ1,0;0,0〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉 − |011〉)htp
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|−〉p + |−〉t|+〉p)− |−〉h(|+〉t|+〉p + |−〉t|−〉p)], (6)
|ψ0,0;0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉+ |101〉)htp
4=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉p − |−〉t|−〉p) + |−〉h(|+〉t|−〉p − |−〉t|+〉p)], (7)
|ψ1,1;0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉 − |101〉)htp
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|−〉p − |−〉t|+〉p) + |−〉h(|+〉t|+〉p − |−〉t|−〉p)], (8)
|ψ0,1;0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉+ |001〉)htp
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉p − |−〉t|−〉p) + |−〉h(|−〉t|+〉p − |+〉t|−〉p)], (9)
|ψ1,0;0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉 − |001〉)htp
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|−〉p − |−〉t|+〉p) + |−〉h(|−〉t|−〉p − |+〉t|+〉p)], (10)
where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), (11)
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (12)
h stands for “ home, ” t stands for “ travel, ” and p stands for “ post ”.
Suppose that Alice has a secret message consisting of 4N bits; i.e., Alice’s mes-
sage = {(i1, j1, f1, g1), (i2, j2, f2, g2), . . . , (iN , jN , fN , gN)}, where in, jn, gn ∈ {0, 1},
fn=0. Bob has another secret message consisting of 4N bits, too; i.e., Bob’s message
= {(k1, l1, w1, v1), (k2, l2, w2, v2), . . . , (kM , lM , wM , vM)}, where kn, ln, vn ∈ {0, 1}, wn=0.
For Bob and Alice, each of them can encode their own secret message (a, b, c, d)
(a, b, d ∈ [0, 1], c = 0) by performing the unitary operation Cta,b ⊗ Cpc,d on the travelled
qubits; |Ψa,b;c,d〉 = Cta,b ⊗ Cpc,d|ψ0,0;0,0〉,, where Ct0,0, Ct0,1, Ct1,0, Ct1,1, Cp0,0, and Cp0,1 denote I t,
σtx, σ
t
y, σ
t
z , I
p, and σpx, respectively.
(S1) To securely exchange their messages or, in other words, to carry out a secret dialogue,
Bob first produces a large enough number of GHZ states, all in the state |ψ0,0;0,0〉. Bob keeps
particles h with him and chooses particles (t, p) as encoding-decoding group particles. Bob
5and Alice arrange to only perform one of the eight operations on particles (h, p) as
U0 = I
t ⊗ Ip, U1 = σtz ⊗ Ip, U2 = σtx ⊗ Ip, U3 = iσty ⊗ Ip,
U4 = I
t ⊗ σpx, U5 = σtz ⊗ σpx, U6 = σtx ⊗ σpx, U7 = iσty ⊗ σpx.
(13)
(S2) Bob encodes his bits (kn, ln, wn, vn) by applying UB = C
t
kn,ln
⊗ Cpwn,vn(B ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}) on the GHZ state |ψ0,0;0,0〉. He keeps qubits h with him and sends
qubits (t, p) through two different quantum channels to Alice. Then, Bob lets Alice know
that he has sent qubits (t, p).
(S3) Alice confirms to Bob that she has received the qubits. Bob tells Alice which mode
they are: the message mode (MM) run or the control mode (CM) run. If it is a CM (MM)
run, the procedure goes to S4 (S5).
(S4) Alice selects randomly sufficiently large groups as checking groups and the groups
leftover as encoding-decoding groups. She chooses randomly one of the two sets of measuring
basis (MB), {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉}, by measuring her qubits to check for the intercept-and-
resend attack. She announces her choices and her measurement outcomes. Bob performs
his measurement under the same MB as that chosen by Alice on the corresponding photons
in his checking groups. If their measurement outcomes coincide when both of them use
the same basis according to Eq. (3)−(10). There are no Eves in line. This communication
continues. In this case, Alice and Bob continue to transmit the next bits. Otherwise, they
have to discard their transmission and abort the communication.
(S5) Alice encodes her bits (in, jn, fn, gn) by applying UA=C
t
in,jn
⊗ Cpfn,gn(A ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}) on the encoding-decoding groups. Then, Alice sends back qubits (t,
p) to Bob, and lets Bob know that.
(S6) Aware of Alice’s confirmation, Bob performs a GHZ state basis measurement on the
three qubits. The result in state |Ψ(xn,yn);(rn,sn)〉 (xn, yn, rn, sn ∈ {0, 1}) is
|Ψ(xn,yn);(rn,sn)〉 = UBUA|ψ0,0;0,0〉
= Ctkn,ln ⊗ Cpwn,vn ⊗ Ctin,jn ⊗ Cpfn,gn|ψ0,0;0,0〉
= Ctin⊕kn,jn⊕ln ⊗ Cpfn⊕wn,gn⊕vn |ψ0,0;0,0〉
6= φin,jn;kn,lnφfn,gn;wn,vn|ψin⊕kn,jn⊕ln;fn⊕wn,gn⊕vn〉, (14)
where ⊕ denotes an addition mod 2, φi,j;k,l and φf,g;w,v are phase factors (φ = 1 or ±i
depending on the values of (i, j, k, l) and (f, g, w, v)).
(S7) With a certain possibility, Alice and Bob reveal some bits to check the entangle-
and-measure attack when particles are travelling from Alice to Bob. If there are no attacks,
Alice’s bits and Bob’s bits should have the deterministic correlation (in =| xn − kn |, jn =|
yn − ln |, fn =| rn − wn |, gn =| sn − vn |). The communication continues. Otherwise, Bob
publicly tells Alice that Eve is in the line, and the communication is aborted.
(S8) Bob decodes Alice’s secret bits as (in =| xn − kn |, jn =| yn − ln |, fn =| rn − wn |,
gn =| sn − vn |), and he reads the 3 bits of information. If he publicly announces the
values of (xn, yn, rn, sn) , then Alice can also decode Bob’s secret bits as (kn =| xn − in |,
ln =| yn − jn |, wn =| rn − fn |, vn =| sn − gn |), and she read the 3 bits of information, too.
Then the procedure goes to S2, and Bob and Alice continue to transmit their next bits. The
dialogue has been successfully completed.
In some cases, Alice and Bob can take some bits as checking bits, and they can reveal the
value of the checking bits to check for the entangle-and-measure attack [11] when the two
qubits are travelling from Alice to Bob; i.e., Bob takes (kn, ln) as secret bits and (wn, vn) as
checking bits. Alice takes (in, jn) as secret bits and (fn, gn) as checking bits, and publicly
reveals the value of the checking bits. Then, Bob checks for Eves: if both fn =| rn − wn |
and gn =| sn − vn |, Bob holds; there are no Eves measuring the two qubits (tn, pn). The
communication is secure. Otherwise, Bob and Alice have to discard their transmission and
abort the communication.
In conclusion, we have proposed a new quantum dialogue protocol for two legitimate
parties to exchange their secret messages simultaneously by using the GHZ state. The result
shows that, for such a GHZ state quantum channel, a quantum dialogue can be realized
between two users successfully. Compared with previous schemes, there are some differences
in scheme proposed in this paper. Firstly, the quantum channel is different. Secondly,
because the encoding-decoding particles are sent with a large number of checking particles
simultaneously through two different quantum channels, it is hard for Eve to catch the right
two particles in one group of the encoding-decoding groups simultaneously. Thus, the total
probability of an eavesdrop by Eve is very small. This scheme can also be generalized to
7the N -particle GHZ state system; Bob keeps particle 1 with him in each N -particle GHZ
state and sends the remaining N − 1 particles to Alice. Thus, N − 1 channels are needed,
so the total probability of an eavesdrop by Eve will go down with increasing number of
channels. Thirdly, Alice and Bob can take some bits as checking bits and reveal the value
of the checking bits to check for the entangle-and-measure attack when the qubits are sent
from Alice to Bob, making sure the communication is secure. Fourthly, the protocol makes
subtle use of superdense coding [15, 16, 17] to double the quantum channel, and each party
is able at the same time to send three secret bits information and to read three secret
bits information. The efficiency of information transmission is successfully increased. The
intercept-and-resend attack, as well as the entangle-and-measure attack, can be detected
efficiently in our protocol. Though it is experimentally more difficult to prepare GHZ states
as compared to EPR states, for such a GHZ state quantum channel, we can not only increase
the effective information but also improve the security in our protocol, so our protocol is
feasible.
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